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ABSTRACT
Employers have been launching phased retirement programs to help workers navigate the transition
from work to retirement more effectively. This paper examines the experience of the phased
retirement system for tenured faculty in the University of North Carolina system. After phased
retirement was introduced, there was a sizable increase in the overall separation rate in the system.
A multinomial logit model of the retirement decision as a function of pension incentives, employee
performance, demographics, and campus characteristics is developed. The key empirical result is
that the odds of entering phased retirement are strongly and inversely related to employee
performance, as measured by recent pay increases.
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cflsg@eiu.eduIn its simplest version, the life cycle theory of labor supply predicts that workers 
gradually cut back labor hours as the rewards from continued work decline and the time 
horizon over which retirement assets can be consumed shortens.  This prediction has 
not been consistent with actual hours profiles of many retiring workers, who shift 
instantaneously from a full-time, year-around schedule to zero hours.  This pattern of 
retirement has been facilitated in part by corporate retirement policies that require 
workers to resign before they can be eligible for pension benefits.  Thus, many workers 
must quit their current full-time job and seek other employment if they wish to reduce 
weekly hours of work instead of completely leaving the labor force.   
Recently, employers in some sectors have become more interested in retaining 
older workers.  Reasons for this change in attitudes include an increase in the relative 
productivity of older workers, the overall shortage of skilled labor, and slower growth of 
the labor force.  Some firms have begun to experiment with phased retirement plans that 
allow workers to start receiving pension benefits while they continue to work part-time.   
This encourages older workers to remain on the job part time instead of completely 
retiring.  Workers entering phased retirement may be required to relinquish some of the 
claims on continued employment and provide the employer with increased employment 
flexibility.  
Relatively little economic analysis has attempted to examine the objectives of 
phased retirement programs and whether phased retirement plans have achieved these 
goals.  Key questions that need to be answered include: 
1.         How many workers elect to enter phased retirement?  
2.  In the absence of a phased retirement program, would phased retirees 
have fully retired or remained on the job full-time?   
3.  How will the introduction of phased retirement affect productivity?   2
Important public policy issues arise because pension regulations limit the options 
available to employers in designing phased retirement programs.  Before deciding 
whether existing pension regulations should be amended to encourage the use of 
phased retirement programs, it would be useful to have some rigorous, empirical 
evidence on the effectiveness of phased retirement programs.   
As a first step, this paper examines the experience of a single organization with 
phased retirement – tenured faculty in the University of North Carolina system.  
University faculty are by no means representative of the overall labor force; they are 
highly skilled and have self-selected into a career track with the prospect of lifetime job 
security.  However, they face the same optimization problem of how to balance labor 
and leisure over the life cycle as every other worker.  In addition, higher education is the 
sector of the economy with the highest incidence of phased retirement programs.
1  The 
tenure system does not generally allow for part-time work.  Thus, most phased retired 
programs at universities require faculty to give up tenure in exchange for a fixed term 
contract allowing for part-time work. 
Our analysis focuses on two main issues.  First, how many faculty members 
have chosen phased retirement and whether those selecting phased retirement are 
doing so instead of continuing to work full-time or instead of retiring completely.  This will 
be examined by comparing retirement behavior before and after the introduction of 
phased retirement, using both summary statistics and probit analysis.  Second, how 
does the provision of phased retirement affect faculty productivity?  The answer to this 
latter question depends on whether high or low productivity faculty are enrolling in 
phased retirement and whether in the absence of this program, these employees would 
have remained on the job or retired.  Some preliminary evidence on these issues is 
                                                  
1 A survey by Watson Wyatt (1999) found that 36 percent of the employers in the education 
industry had phased retirement plans.   3
reported in Ghent, Allen, and Clark (2001), which contains a descriptive analysis of 
retirement patterns before and after the introduction of phased retirement.
2  This paper 
develops a multinomial logit model of retirement behavior which includes measures of 
variables reflecting economic incentives to retire (e.g., pension backloading) and 
measures of faculty productivity.   
 
I. THE ECONOMICS OF PHASED RETIREMENT 
To understand how the introduction of a phased retirement plan affects labor 
supply, consider a simple one period labor-leisure choice model.
3  Assume that workers 
have three choices in the absence of a phased retirement plan: (1) work full-time for H 
hours in a career job and earn income Y with zero pension income, (2) work half-time at 
another employer for 0.5H hours and earn Y’ with full pension income P, and (3) retire 
from the career job and receive P.  Let worker utility be represented by U=U(y, T-h), 
where y = income, T = time endowment, and h = labor hours.  Workers compare U1(Y, 
T-H) to U2(Y’+P, T-0.5H) and U3(P, T) and select the option that yields the maximum 
utility level.   
The desirability of part-time work depends on how much labor income must be 
sacrificed to obtain a half-time hours reduction.  For most workers we expect 0.5Y > Y’; 
that is, the half-time salary at another employer would be less than half of the full-time 
salary.  This would happen because (1) specific human capital at the original job would 
not be valued at the new job and (2) wage rates on part-time jobs tend to be lower than 
on full-time jobs.  The greater the income sacrifice needed to obtain a part-time work 
schedule (Y-Y’), the lower the odds of working part-time.   
                                                  
2 Kim (2003) examines the relationship between faculty productivity and the voluntary early 
retirement programs in the University of California system in the early 1990s.   
3 For a more rigorous approach to the choice of full and part time work near retirement in a life 
cycle context, see Gustman and Steinmeier (1986).     4
The probability of selecting either part-time work or full-time retirement is 
influenced by employer retirement programs.  An increase in the present value of the 
pension benefits will be associated with a greater likelihood of both full and phased 
retirement.  Once a worker has accumulated the rights to a pension that meets or 
exceeds half of his regular salary, phased retirement at half-pay allows him to receive 
more income while working fewer hours while in phased retirement.  Work and 
retirement choices also are affected by accrual of pension benefits with continued full-
time employment.  If an individual anticipates a sizable increase in pension income by 
staying with an organization a few years more, then the likelihood of retirement is 
expected to be quite lower.  On the other hand, if pension benefits do not increase, or 
even decrease, with continued work, the odds of retirement should be quite high.   
The phased retirement plan provided by the UNC system offers tenured faculty 
the option of working half-time for half the full-time academic salary.  For many faculty 
this represents an increase in Y’, the amount of income they can earn half time.  This 
would have the usual income and substitution effects in a framework where there is a 
continuous choice of hours.  The higher part-time salary makes part-time work more 
attractive.  The labor-leisure choice of faculty who can earn half or more of their regular 
academic salary by working half-time off campus would not be affected by the 
introduction of this type of phased retirement scheme. 
If one expands the framework to life-cycle optimization, two additional issues 
arise.  First, the greater payoff to part-time work in the later stages of one’s career 
lowers the marginal utility of income and thus increases the demand for leisure in all 
stages of the life cycle.  This partial effect would translate into earlier shifts to part-time 
work and full retirement.  Combining this effect with the incentive to substitute part-time 
work for full-time work and full-time retirement noted previously, we can trace out the full 
effects of phased retirement over the life cycle.  The odds of working part-time in the   5
years preceding complete retirement unambiguously increase, whereas the timing of 
complete retirement might be delayed (because of the greater incentive to work part-
time) or accelerated (because more income is generated for those who would have 
worked part-time anyway).   
Second, one must be careful to distinguish between the adjustments that would 
take place when phased retirement is introduced with enough lead time that workers can 
fully adjust their lifetime labor-leisure choice decision versus the adjustments that would 
take place when phased retirement is introduced unexpectedly and is available 
immediately.  In all likelihood there was a backlog of demand for phased retirement at 
the time it was introduced in the UNC system, so one must be careful to examine more 
than one year of data to be able to gauge its impact in a steady state.   
From an employer standpoint, there are two important issues associated with the 
introduction of phased retirement: what happens to the retirement rate and what 
happens to productivity?  Phased retirement makes bridge jobs at other employers less 
attractive, thereby increasing employee retention in terms of duration of employer 
attachment.  However, it also increases the odds that a worker will move from a full-time 
to a part-time schedule, so that the impact on an hours-weighted indicator of mobility is 
more difficult to determine.  Empirically, employers would want to know the impact of 
phased retirement on the total retirement rate and how that outflow varies by age, 
experience, and quality of workers.   
The net effect on faculty productivity depends on two issues: who selects phased 
retirement and does phased retirement shorten or lengthen employer-employee 
attachments?  If the probability of entering phased retirement is inversely related to 
faculty productivity and phased retirement shortens job durations, then the introduction 
of phased retirement enhances faculty productivity.   Productivity effects vanish or 
change signs under different assumptions about these two conditions.   6
The implications from this discussion for empirical work are as follows: 
•  Some employees will view the introduction of a phased retirement plan favorably.  
After a plan is introduced, the sum of the rates of full and phased retirement will 
exceed the rate of full retirement that prevailed beforehand. 
•  The financial incentive for entering phased retirement depends on how the part-time 
salary offered under the plan compares to part-time salaries off-campus.  The plan 
will be most attractive to those with the least attractive opportunities off-campus.   
•  The introduction of a phased retirement plan could have important effects on faculty 
productivity; the direction of those effects cannot be predicted a priori.   
•  The odds of entering phased retirement will be heavily influenced by pension plan 
characteristics.   
 
II. PHASED RETIREMENT PROGRAMS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
  Higher education is particularly well-suited for phased retirement programs 
because of rising concerns about managing the age structure of the professorate 
(Watson Wyatt Worldwide, 1999; William Mercer Company, 2001).  The elimination of 
mandatory retirement for tenured faculty in 1994 meant that faculty age 70 and older had 
the right to remain on the job until they decide to retire.  In addition, rapid aging has 
dramatically altered the age structure of university faculties.  In this new environment, 
many colleges and universities have opted to provide older faculty with the additional 
choice of part-time work.  A recent survey conducted by the Committee on Retirement of 
the American Association of University Professors indicated that of the responding 
institutions, 35 percent of the Research and Doctoral institutions were offering formal 
phased retirement plans and 29 percent of Masters and Baccalaureate institutions had   7
adopted formal phased retirement programs.  These plans were much more prevalent at 
private institutions.   
Further examination of the responding institutions in the AAUP survey reveals 
that phased retirement programs are more prevalent among institutions that have a 
greater proportion of their faculty who are tenured and in the older age groups.  For 
example, 17 percent of institutions with less than 40 percent of their faculty tenured offer 
phased retirement programs while the incidence of these plans is 27 percent when the 
proportion of the faculty that is tenured is 40 to 60 percent.  These rates can be 
compared to 31 percent in institutions offering phased retirement when the tenure rate is 
60 to 80 percent and 52 percent offer such plans when 80 percent or more of the faculty 
is tenured.  In addition, 18 percent of institutions with less than 10 percent of their faculty 
age 60 or over offer phased retirement plans while roughly one third of those with more 
than 10 percent of the faculty over age 60 have introduced phased retirement plans.   
In 1996, the Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina (UNC) 
adopted a phased retirement plan that would allow older faculty with sufficient service to 
reduce their workloads while remaining with the university.
4  The objective of this 
program was to provide faculty with a new employment option of remaining on the job 
part time for a fixed period of time after their retirement.  The program provided for a 
tenured faculty member to relinquish tenure in exchange for a fixed term contract that 
specified half-time work for half-time pay.   
Each of the 15 campuses in the UNC system that grant tenure was required to 
implement a phased retirement program.
5  To be eligible for the program, faculty must 
                                                  
4 The UNC faculty aged rapidly between 1982 and 1999.  During this period, the proportion of the 
faculty aged 55 and older increased from 18.2 percent to 31.2 percent and the mean age of the 
faculty rose from 44.5 years to 49.4 years (Clark and Ghent, 2000). 
 
5 The NC School of the Arts is also a member of the UNC system, but it does not award tenure. 
   8
be tenured.  They also had to be age 50 with 20 years of service or age 60 with 5 years 
of service at the same institution.  Each campus was allowed to select the length of the 
contract for its faculty; however, the program required a minimum length of one year and 
a maximum length of five years.  Twelve of the 15 institutions chose a three-year phased 
retirement contract, two institutions chose a two-year contract, and one campus chose a 
five-year phased retirement contract.   
Individuals who were considering entering the program negotiate their half-time 
duties with their department chairs prior to accepting phased retirement.  Duties could be 
performed evenly across both semesters or the individual could work full-time one 
semester and have no specific assigned duties the next semester.  Persons in phased 
retirement do not receive most employee benefits.  If they begin their retirement benefits, 
they are eligible for the same health insurance as active employees.
6 
Using employment records for the years immediately preceding the introduction 
of the phased retirement program and the first three years of experience with the 
program, we are able to assess the determinants of phased retirement and the impact of 
phased retirement on the rate of full retirement.  A key question in this analysis is 
whether phased retirees are individuals who would have been more likely to remain on 
the job full time if the program were not offered or whether they would have been more 
likely to retire in its absence. 
The data used in the analysis are based on the annual faculty censuses that 
each campus is required to submit to the General Administration of the UNC system.  
These are the employment records for all faculty employed as of September of the 
specified year.  Information on each person includes age, hire date, rank, gender, race, 
                                                  
6 Interested readers can examine the details of the phased retirement program at NC State 
University by looking on the World Wide Web at 
http://www.ncsu.edu/provost/offices/academic_personnel/policy/phased_retirement/index.html.  
   9
tenure status, annual salary, and type of pension plan.  The annual records are linked 
across years so we are able to determine whether an individual remains in his or her 
faculty position from one year to the next.  The census data for the years 1994 until 2000 
are employed in this study.  The analysis is limited to faculty members who were eligible 
to enter the phased retirement program.  This means that the sample includes only 
tenured faculty who were at least age 50 with 20 or more years of service or at least age 
60 with 5 or more years of service. 
What would the employees selecting phased retirement have done had the 
option not been available? Would they have worked fulltime or fully retired?  In the three 
years prior to the introduction of phased retirement, the retirement rate from UNC 
institutions among eligible faculty age 50 was 8.7 percent.  After the introduction of the 
new retirement program, the total retirement rate (full retirement plus phased retirement) 
increased to 10.4 percent in 1997-98, 11.3 percent in 1998-99, and 10.4 percent in 
1999-2000
7.  The percentage of faculty selecting phased retirement was 3.2 in 1997-98, 
2.3 in 1998-99, and 3.0 in 1999-2000.  The full retirement rates were 7.2 percent in 
1997-98, 9.0 percent in 1998-99, and 7.4 percent in 1999-2000.  During these years, 
phased retirees represented 24 percent of all retirements from the UNC system.  In 
absolute numbers, about 70 faculty entered the phased retirement program each year 
while around 225 fully retired. 
One might question whether this increase in retirement rates was caused by the 
introduction of the phased retirement program or by other factors influencing the 
incentives to remain employed in the UNC system.  Because the phased retirement 
program was launched across all campuses at the same time, there are no experimental 
data that can be used to address this issue directly.  Indirectly, however, full-time faculty 
                                                  
7 The pairing of years (1997-98) indicates the ratio of those employed in the initial year (1997) 
who were retired in the later year (1998).    10
in the North Carolina Community College System (NCCCS) represent a reasonable 
control group.  They do not have a phased retirement option.  Their decision to remain 
employed will be influenced by the same budgetary and retirement system parameters 
that face UNC system faculty.  If there were an increase in the retirement rates for 
NCCCS faculty taking place at the same time that phased retirement was introduced, 
that would serve as evidence that other factors were contributing to the observed 
increase in overall retirement rates.  On the other hand, if the retirement rates for 
NCCCS faculty remained unchanged, that would provide further evidence that the 
phased retirement program had causal effects.   
Table 1 reports full and phased retirement rates for UNC system faculty and full 
retirement rates for NCCCS faculty by year.  The comparison between the two groups is 
very striking.  There is a permanent increase in the overall retirement rate for UNC 
system faculty in the year when phased retirement was introduced.  There is absolutely 
no change throughout the period in the retirement rate for community and technical 
college faculty.  Given the fact that prospective salary increases and pension plan 
parameters for the two groups are the same, it is hard to believe that the increase in 
retirement rates for UNC system was caused by anything other than the phased 
retirement plan.   
Further evidence that the phased retirement plan had causal effects is reported 
in Ghent, Allen, and Clark (2001).   Ghent et al. estimated two retirement probit 
equations using data for 1997-99: one in which retirement was defined as full retirement 
only and another in which retirement was defined as either full or phased retirement.  
The same model was estimated for 1995-97, when full retirement was the only option. 
Then two different across-sample pooling tests were conducted.  The tests concluded 
that the 1997-99 retirement probit with the dependent variable equal to one only if the 
individual completely retired could be pooled with the 1995-97 data to estimate a   11
retirement equation.  However, when retirement in 1997-99 was defined to be both 
complete or phased retirement, the data could not be pooled.  Assuming that the 
estimated retirement equations were stable over time, this implies that the phased 
retirees "fit better" when not counted as retired.  Thus, the data indicate that the phased 
retirees of 1997-98 more closely resembled faculty members choosing to remain full-
time in 1995-96 than those who chose to completely retire in 1995-96. 
  
III.  EMPIRICAL MODEL  
How does the introduction of phased retirement affect the labor-leisure decision 
of tenured faculty in the UNC system?  How does faculty productivity change as a result 
of those decisions?  We use a multinomial logit model, where employees have three 
options: work full-time (A), enter phased retirement (R), and enter full retirement (F).  
The probabilities of employee i entering each of these three states are  
Prob(Yi = F) = exp(β Fxi)/(1+exp(β Fxi)+exp(β pxi)) 
Prob(Yi = P) = exp(β Pxi)/(1+exp(β Fxi)+exp(β pxi)) 
    Prob(Yi = A) = 1/(1+exp(β Fxi)+exp(β pxi)) 
The coefficients from this framework are useful for determining which variables have an 
impact on retirement decisions, but the entire set of coefficients must be transformed in 
order to determine the impact of each variable.  For instance, to examine the difference 
in retirement odds between workers with 30 and 20 years of service, we calculate 
predicted probabilities for the entire sample using actual values for all xi except years of 
service, which will be set at 20 years for all employees and then reset at 30 years.  The 
difference between the two sets of predicted probabilities will indicate how a 20 to 30   12
year difference in time employed affects retirement odds.  Similar calculations are 
performed to obtain the predicted impact of binary variables.
8    
  The retirement decision is modeled as a function of demographics (gender, race, 
and age), pension incentives, employee performance, and unique variables that are 
likely to be associated with the impact of phased retirement on the decisions of UNC 
system faculty.  Correlations between retirement and either gender or race (separate 
indicators for African-Americans, Asian or Asian- American, and other nonwhites) could 
reflect differences in either life expectancy or attitudes toward retirement.  Binary 
indicators of age are used to avoid arbitrary constraints on the relationship between age 
and retirement and to capture any spikes in the retirement hazard.   
  UNC faculty members hired since 1971 have had the option of enrolling in the 
Teachers’ and State Employees’ Retirement System (TSERS) or in an optional 
retirement program (ORP).  Currently the ORP options include TIAA-CREF, Lincoln Life, 
Fidelity Investments, and VALIC.  TSERS is a defined benefit plan, with the benefit 
formula equal to the product of a constant, years of credited service, and final salary 
average.  Employees are eligible for partial benefits when they reach age 50 and have 
20 years of service
9; for full benefits, at age 60 and 5 years of service or at 30 years of 
service.  Once an employee is eligible for partial benefits, the constant in the benefit 
formula gradually increases by three to five percent for each additional year of service.   
  To understand the impact of pension characteristics on retirement incentives, it is 
useful to focus on pension wealth, pension accrual, and pension backloading.  Pension 
wealth at time t is the present value of the expected lifetime income from a stream of 
pension income if one retires at time t.  Higher levels of pension wealth should be 
associated with a greater likelihood of retirement through pure wealth effects.  Pension 
                                                  
8 All models were estimated using the mlogit procedure in Stata, version 6. 
9 These are identical to the eligibility criteria for phased retirement for tenured professors.   13
accrual is the change in pension wealth between year t-1 and year t.  Pension accrual is 
typically positive in a plan such as the TSERS up through the age of normal retirement, 
as the constant, years of service and salary average all increase with t up until that point.  
In a defined contribution plan, pension accrual reflects the contributions into the plan by 
the firm and the worker.   Pension backloading arises in defined benefit plans because a 
large percentage of the accruals take place in the five years or so before early or normal 
retirement.
10  It equals the difference between maximum pension wealth (across all 
possible retirement ages) and pension wealth if one retires immediately.  Pension 
accrual and backloading should be associated with a lower likelihood of retirement; high 
values of these variables indicate a financial incentive to delay retirement.   
  For faculty in the TSERS, the pension benefit formula is used to construct 
measures of these three pension variables.  Pension wealth is calculated under the 
assumptions of no post-retirement increases in benefits, a three percent discount rate, 
and a maximum life expectancy of 100 years.
11  Pension accrual is the change in 
pension wealth that results if the employee works for another year; salary growth is 
assumed to be two percent.   
Option value is used in some studies to measure pension backloading, but full 
implementation of the model developed by Stock and Wise (1990) in a multinomial logit 
framework is beyond the scope of this study.  We experimented with the approach used 
by Coile and Gruber (2000) where specific values of the risk aversion, discount rate, and 
disutility of work parameters were assigned so that option value could be used as one of 
the xi.  However, when we calculated the option value measure used by Coile and 
Gruber, it implied that for about half of the workers in our sample, utility would not be 
maximized unless they worked at least another 20 years.  With a mean age of 58.3 and 
                                                  
10 See Ippolito (1985) for a full explanation.     14
a maximum age of 75, we concluded that we would have to experiment with a much 
broader range of utility function parameters in order to successfully apply that approach 
over our sample. 
Instead we used an alternative measure of backloading developed by Coile and 
Gruber called peak value.  To calculate peak value, one must estimate pension wealth at 
all future retirement dates.  Peak value equals the difference between maximum pension 
wealth at some future retirement date and pension wealth if an employee retires 
immediately.  It indicates how much can be gained in pension wealth by delaying 
retirement.   
The full impact of pension incentives cannot be estimated for employees in ORPs 
because our data set contains no information on their pension wealth and by design 
there is no backloading.  Pension accrual in a defined contribution plan is a function of 
two variables: (1) employee and employer contributions to the plan and (2) the 
investment performance of the assets in the plan.  The latter component is not 
observable in our data set, so we use pension contributions (12.84 percent of salary) as 
our measure of accrual for those in ORPS.  Pension contributions do not vary with age 
or years of service in the North Carolina system.  An indicator of whether an employee is 
in TSERS or one of the ORPs is included in the model when the two samples are 
pooled.  This variable acts as a proxy for differences in pension incentives and for 
differences in tastes and behavior associated with pension choice.
12  Pension 
backloading is set equal to zero for employees in ORPs as well as for those who would 
have maximized their pension wealth by retiring in an earlier year.  A binary variable is 
                                                                                                                                                
11 Conditional age-specific survival probabilities from Anderson (2001) were used in these 
calculations.   
12 Clark and Pitts (1999) empirically examine the TSERS/ORP choice faced by faculty at NC 
State.  Ghent, Clark and McDermed (2003) examine the choice for newly hired faculty at all 15 
UNC institutions from 1983-2000.     15
included in the model to flag the latter set of individuals because they may very well 
have preferences on labor-leisure choice that are quite distinct from the average worker.   
Current salary and years of service are included in the model as controls.  Much 
of the variation in pension incentives across individuals in TSERS reflects variation in 
these two variables because they are part of the benefit formula.  It would be 
presumptuous to omit them from the model and then claim to have produced evidence of 
the effects of pensions.  Also, both salary and years of service could have independent 
causal impact.  The cost of entering phased or full retirement rises with salary; years of 
service are an indicator of match quality.   
Two variables are examined to determine how faculty productivity changes with 
the availability of phased retirement.  There is no formal system of performance ratings 
for UNC system faculty, although performance appraisals are conducted annually.  
Faculty pay increases in the UNC system were given strictly on the basis of merit during 
the sample period, so this is the most logical available measure of relative performance.  
The mean pay increase for each faculty member over the previous three years of 
employment is used in this study.  The use of three years of data instead of one is 
intended to smooth out noise factors, such as promotion or a transitory shock to 
performance.  We also include academic rank in the model as a performance measure.  
In a sample of tenured faculty eligible for retirement benefits, full professors have 
presumably been judged more productive than associate or assistant professors.   
It is natural to expect the response of the UNC system faculty to the availability of 
phased retirement to vary with some unique features of the employer and its system of 
human resource policies.  A potentially important factor is teaching loads, which vary 
across campuses depending on the mission of the university.  Faculty workloads consist 
not just of teaching, but also of research, service to the university, and service to the 
community.  Of these four dimensions, however, teaching effectiveness is the only one   16
where time allocation can be observed systematically and with short time lags.  For the 
optimizing shirker interested in on-the-job leisure, the risk of being penalized for cutting 
back on time allocated to research and service is much lower than the risk for cutting 
back on time allocated to teaching.  As any dean or department head knows, poor 
research productivity can be disguised for a while by explanations such as bad draws 
from the referee lottery or long lags needed for an ambitious project. 
Other faculty on research-oriented campuses may seek the ability to shift time 
away from teaching toward research.  In disciplines where grants and contracts are not 
widely available, phased retirement would be valuable to faculty seeking extra time for 
scholarly pursuits.  The structure of colleges and departments varies so much across the 
15 campuses that it was impossible to develop reliable indicators of such disciplines in 
our data.   
Faculty on teaching-centered campuses have much less ability to substitute on-
the-job leisure for work on research.  Put alternatively, a 50 percent reduction in teaching 
loads buys much more free time on teaching-centered campuses than on those which 
place a greater emphasis on research.  This would lead us to expect phased retirement 
to be less attractive to faculty in Research I universities (UNC-Chapel Hill, NC State) 
than other campuses, which fall into the categories of Doctoral, Masters, and 
Baccalaureate.
13  
Summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis are reported in 
Appendix Table 1.  Although there is widespread concern about a rising share of 
professors age 70 and older, it should be noted that faculty in this age group represent 
less than two percent of a sample that excludes all faculty under 50.  In fact, only 8.4 
                                                  
13 Other campuses in the sample by Carnegie classification are Doctoral I and II (UNC-
Greensboro, East Carolina), Masters I (Appalachian State, Fayetteville State, NC A&T, NC 
Central, UNC-Charlotte, UNC-Pembroke, UNC-Wilmington, Western Carolina) and Baccalaureate 
I and II (UNC-Asheville, Elizabeth City State, Winston-Salem State).   17
percent of the faculty in the sample are over age 65.  Over half of the sample is enrolled 
in TSERS, and those faculty members have mean pension wealth of $436,651 if they 
retired immediately.  Pension backloading, the difference between maximum expected 
future pension wealth and pension wealth if they retire now, is rather sizable (mean 
$56,253 for TSERS faculty) compared to pension accruals (mean $8,585 for the entire 
sample, mean $6,877 for TSERS faculty).   
The last two columns of Appendix Table 1 show how full and phased retirement 
rates vary by sample characteristics.  Both rates rise with age.  The full retirement rate 
spikes after age 59, 61, 64, and 69.
14  The first spike corresponds with eligibility for full 
benefits in TSERS; the middle two with eligibility for early and normal Social Security 
benefits.  The spike at age 69 may reflect peer pressure to leave by age 70, despite the 
elimination of mandatory retirement at that age.  The phased retirement rate spikes after 
ages 58, 64, and 70, reflecting many of these same factors.   
Women have higher full retirement rates than men, but phased retirement rates 
for men and women are not very different.  Nonwhites have lower phased retirement 
rates than whites, but higher full retirement rates.  Both full and phased retirement rates 
are remarkably higher for faculty in TSERS than those in ORPs, possibly reflecting self-
selection.  Faculty who have not reached the rank of full professor have higher full and 
phased retirement rates than full professors.  Full and phased retirement rates are lower 
on the two Research I campuses than on the other 13 campuses in the UNC system.   
 
IV.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Three samples are examined in the empirical results: the entire sample, a 
subsample limited to workers in the defined benefit plan (TSERS), and a subsample   18
limited to workers in defined contribution plans (ORPs).  There are three reasons for 
splitting the sample by type of pension plan: (1) a measure of pension wealth and an 
independent measure of pension accruals are only available for those in TSERS; (2) 
examining TSERS participants by themselves permits a cleaner estimate of the impact 
of pension backloading; and (3) self-selection by workers into TSERS and ORPs implies 
that the coefficients for each group need not be the same.   
Predicted retirement odds derived from the estimated coefficients are calculated 
at the sample means for all other variables in model and are reported in Table 1 along 
with their levels of significance.  The results in Table 1 are based on the entire sample, 
except for those pertaining to pension backloading, which are based on the TSERS 
sample.
15  The most important result in Table 1 is that both full and phased retirement 
odds decrease sharply with employee performance, measured in terms of average pay 
increase over the last three years.  Compare two professors, one who received no pay 
raise for three years and the other with an average raise of eight percent (roughly twice 
the amount budgeted for raises during the sample period).  The professor who received 
no raise has a 10.3 percent chance of fully retiring and a 4.3 percent chance of entering 
phased retirement.  The professor who averaged an eight percent raise has a 5.9 
percent chance of fully retiring and only a 1.7 percent chance of entering phased 
retirement.   
What does this mean for faculty productivity?  Recall the finding from section 3 
that those who select phased retirement more closely resemble active employees than 
those selecting full retirement.  Because faculty who receive low pay increases are much 
more likely to enter phased retirement than faculty earning sizable pay raises, the 
introduction of phased retirement is apparently accelerating the rate at which low-
                                                                                                                                                
14 Retirement rates are calculated by comparing faculty rosters in September of year t-1 to 
September of year t.  The age variable refers to age in year t-1.       19
performing faculty separate from the university.  As for the other measure of employee 
performance, there is no difference in the rates at which full, associate, and assistant 
professors enter phased retirement.  However, associate and assistant professors are 
much more likely to fully retire than full professors, so the net effect of the entire 
selection process is consistent with productivity enhancement.   
Phased retirement is much more attractive on campuses where the main mission 
is teaching than on those where the main mission is research.  On Research I 
campuses, the model predicts that 1.6 percent of faculty enter phased retirement, 
compared to 3.2 to 4.0 percent on other campuses.  This is consistent with phased 
retirement providing a greater increase in free time on campuses with heavy teaching 
loads.  Full retirement rates also are lower in research-oriented than teaching-oriented 
campuses. 
Not surprisingly, pension incentives come into play in faculty retirement 
decisions.  Faculty in TSERS are much more likely to enter phased retirement than 
faculty in ORPs.  The predicted phased retirement rate for faculty who selected the 
defined benefit plan is 3.8 percent, compared to 1.6 percent for faculty in defined 
contribution plans.  Full retirement rates also are higher in TSERS.  These patterns 
reflect the greater reward to continued work in ORPs; for most employees in TSERS, 
pension wealth is maximized once they reach their early 60s.   
Pension backloading plays an important role in the decision to enter phased 
retirement.  The odds of entering phased retirement for a person with no pension 
backloading (i.e., someone who has passed the age where his pension wealth is 
maximized in TSERS) are 5.8 percent.  Those odds plummet to 1.0 percent for someone 
who stands to gain an additional $100,000 in TSERS by working additional years.  
                                                                                                                                                
15 Complete multinomial logit results are reported in Appendix Table 2.     20
Pension backloading is also associated with lower retirement odds of full retirement, but 
this effect could not be measured with precision.   
The other two pension variables have modest to zero effect on retirement 
decisions.  Pension accrual is unrelated to the odds of full retirement.  The results for 
pension accrual and phased retirement are conflicting; there is a significant positive 
correlation for the entire sample but when the sample is limited to those in TSERS, the 
coefficient stays the same but is estimated with much less precision.  Pension wealth 
has no correlation with full or phased retirement.  This is not entirely surprising, as 
pension wealth is but one of many sources of assets that can be used to finance 
consumption during retirement.   
As for the other variables, age has the expected effect on retirement decisions; 
the hazard rates implied by the model estimated over the entire sample correspond 
closely to the sample means shown in Appendix Table 1.  Figure 1 reports the predicted 
hazard rates from separate multinomial logit models estimated by type of pension plan.  
Predicted full retirement rates for those in the defined benefit plan were consistently 
higher than the rates for those in the defined contribution plan, but there was no 
difference between the two groups in the pattern of retirement spikes.  Predicted phased 
retirement rates for those in defined benefit and defined contribution plans were roughly 
equal through age 63, but at age 64 and above the predicted probability of entering 
phased retirement was somewhat higher for those in the defined contribution plan than 
for those in the defined benefit plan.  This indicates that the estimated difference in 
phased retirement rates between those in defined benefit and defined contribution plans 
in Table 1 is largely attributable to failure to interact age and type of pension plan.   
Women are more likely to fully retire than men, but there is no gender difference 
in the odds of phased retirement.  African-Americans, Asians and Asian-Americans have 
lower full and phased retirement odds than whites in the multinomial logit results.  The   21
fact that African-Americans have higher full retirement rates in the raw data must reflect 
differences in other variables in the model.  The odds of full retirement increase with 
years of service and salary, but the odds of phased retirement are unrelated to these 
variables.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper has examined the response of UNC system faculty to the introduction 
of a phased retirement plan.  The overall rate at which eligible workers elect to leave full-
time employment with the university increased significantly, accompanied by a small 
decrease in the rate at which workers enter full retirement.  Based on observable 
characteristics such as age, salary, years of service, and job characteristics, faculty 
members entering phased retirement more closely resemble those remaining in full-time 
jobs than those entering full retirement.   
The productivity impact of this increased outflow of faculty depends on whether 
those entering phased retirement are more or less productive than the average faculty 
member.  On this point, the evidence is unambiguous – the odds of entering phased 
retirement are strongly and inversely related to employee performance, as measured by 
recent pay increases.  Faculty members also are more likely to enter phased retirement 
when they have heavy teaching loads and when they are near the age-service level 
where their pension wealth is maximized.  Presuming that junior positions now open up 
more quickly, universities have a greater opportunity to address concerns about an 
aging professoriate.   
On balance, the introduction of phased retirement in the UNC system seems to 
have been a plus from both employee and employer perspectives.  Phased retirees now 
account for slightly more than one-fourth of all flows out of the full-time faculty, indicating 
that a sizable number of faculty members clearly appreciate having more degrees of   22
freedom in making time allocation decisions.  The university system is now getting 
advance warning about employee decisions to fully retire.  Fears that the best and 
brightest faculty might leave academe more rapidly have thus far been unfounded.   
 An important caveat about these findings is that they apply to a workplace 
environment where workers are extremely independent and have lifetime job security.  
Workers who do not have the equivalent of academic tenure still have to balance time at 
work and away from work, so it is quite possible that the share of workers electing 
phased retirement reported here would be comparable across many types of jobs.  
However, to the extent that nonacademic employers can directly control the employee 
productivity through other mechanisms, our results on phased retirement and 
productivity may be limited to the situation at hand.  By providing the first solid evidence 
on the impact of introducing a phased retirement option, this study provides a foundation 
for further work in this area.   23
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 Figure 1.  Predicted full and phased retirement rates from multinomial logit model, by 









59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
DB Full DC Full DB Phased DC Phased
 
 
Note: DB indicates defined benefit plan and DC indicates defined contribution planTable 1.  Retirement rates for North Carolina faculty, by type of institution 
 
Year  UNC system   Community 
College System 
 Full  retirement  Phased 
retirement 
Sum Full  retirement 
1994-95 8.7  8.7  8.1 
1995-96 8.7  8.7  9.0 
1996-97 8.8  8.8  8.7 
1997-98  7.2  3.2 10.4 8.4 
1998-99  9.0  2.3 11.3 8.9 
1999-2000 7.4  3.0  10.4 10.0   26
 
Table 2.  Predicted retirement odds from multinomial logit model, by sample characteristics 





Entire sample    0.079    0.028 
        
Age          
50-52   0.026    0.002 
53-54   0.027    0.006 
55   0.042  0.015 
56   0.043    0.018* 
57   0.038    0.015 
58   0.040    0.046* 
59   0.069*    0.027* 
60   0.074*    0.028* 
61   0.134*    0.032* 
62   0.099*    0.032* 
63   0.094*    0.028* 
64   0.244*    0.067* 
65   0.183*    0.053* 
66   0.194*    0.034* 
67   0.178*    0.031* 
68   0.123*    0.033* 
69   0.254*    0.038* 
70   0.115*    0.085* 
71 and over    0.184*    0.060* 
        
Male   0.072    0.029 
Female   0.116*    0.027 
White   0.084    0.033 
African-American   0.064*    0.006* 
Asian or Asian-American    0.030*    0.011* 
Other nonwhite    0.079    0.032 
        
Defined benefit    0.087*    0.038* 
Defined contribution    0.068    0.016 
        
Full professor    0.072    0.029 
Associate professor    0.091*    0.026 
Assistant professor    0.128*    0.028 
        
Research I    0.067    0.016 
Doctoral     0.092*    0.040* 
Masters   0.083*    0.039* 
Bachelor   0.122*    0.032* 
        
Years of service = 20    0.070*    0.026 
Years of service = 30    0.087*    0.029 
        
Average raise = 0    0.103*    0.043* 
Average raise = 0.08    0.059*    0.017* 
Pension backload = 0    0.098    0.058* 
Pension backload = 100000    0.082    0.010* 
*=Multinomial logit coefficient for this variable is statistically significant at the .05 level.  Omitted categories in 
the multinomial logit model are age 50-52, male, white, defined contribution plan, research 1 university, and 
full professor. 
   27
Appendix Table 1.  Summary statistics 
   Mean  Standard 
deviation 




Total (N=7179)      0.079  0.028 
            
Age: 50-52    0.133  0.340    0.022  0.001 
53-54   0.126  0.331    0.026  0.004 
55   0.073  0.260    0.042  0.013 
56   0.071  0.257    0.045  0.018 
57   0.063  0.243    0.040  0.015 
58   0.066  0.248    0.042  0.053 
59   0.071  0.257    0.072  0.031 
60   0.073  0.260    0.077  0.036 
61   0.061  0.240    0.138  0.041 
62   0.053  0.224    0.099  0.037 
63   0.050  0.218    0.095  0.031 
64   0.044  0.205    0.244  0.079 
65   0.031  0.173    0.171  0.063 
66   0.022  0.148    0.191  0.043 
67   0.019  0.137    0.175  0.036 
68   0.015  0.122    0.137  0.046 
69   0.010  0.100    0.278  0.056 
70   0.006  0.080    0.130  0.109 
71 and over    0.012  0.109    0.198  0.081 
            
Male   0.824  0.381    0.073  0.029 
Female   0.176  0.381    0.104  0.024 
            
White   0.867  0.339    0.078  0.030 
Black   0.080  0.271    0.103  0.010 
Asian   0.040  0.196    0.042  0.017 
Nonwhite   0.013  0.114    0.105  0.042 
            
Defined benefit    0.540  0.498    0.094  0.039 
Defined contribution    0.460  0.498    0.061  0.015 
            
Full professor    0.722  0.448    0.073  0.027 
Associate professor    0.236  0.425    0.082  0.029 
Assistant professor    0.040  0.196    0.160  0.042 
            
Research I    0.460  0.498    0.068  0.016 
Doctoral     0.171  0.376    0.104  0.048 
Masters   0.336  0.472    0.077  0.035 
Bachelor   0.033  0.179    0.121  0.029 
            
Salary   79799  36681       
Years of service    24.6  6.5       
Average raise    0.042  0.038       
Pension accrual    8571  17415       
Pension backloading    50282  92685       
Pension wealth    439226  248572         28
Appendix Table 2.  Coefficients and standard errors of multinomial logit model of full and phased 
retirement 
  Entire sample  Defined benefit  Defined contribution 






Age          
53-54  0.057  0.308      
55  0.524 0.315 0.311 0.373     
56  0.562 0.314 0.590 0.346     
57  0.439 0.333 0.215 0.390     
58  0.534 0.326 0.102 0.407     
59  1.092* 0.290 0.914* 0.334 0.827* 0.323 
60  1.170* 0.291 1.149* 0.357 0.648 0.332 
61  1.852* 0.276 1.712* 0.344 1.543* 0.277 
62  1.505* 0.295 1.311* 0.378 1.247* 0.304 
63  1.436* 0.301 1.253* 0.383 1.178* 0.340 
64  2.686* 0.276 2.555* 0.357 2.305* 0.278 
65  2.273* 0.306 1.880* 0.399 2.356* 0.344 
66  2.319* 0.321 2.066* 0.415 2.237* 0.399 
67  2.203* 0.336 2.259* 0.427 1.182* 0.554 
68  1.758* 0.381 1.509* 0.498 1.659* 0.517 
69  2.692* 0.366 2.340* 0.488 2.541* 0.417 
70  1.750* 0.512 1.432* 0.651 2.541* 0.417 
71 and over  2.291*  0.374  2.230*  0.500  1.857*  0.579 
        
Female  0.577* 0.121 0.550* 0.160 0.632* 0.206 
African-American -0.376*  0.178 -0.298 0.208 -0.507 0.394 
Asian or Asian-
American 
-1.197* 0.309 -0.990* 0.348 -1.786* 0.730 
Other  nonwhite  -0.073 0.359 -0.046 0.438 -0.149 0.646 
        
Salary/10000 0.026*  0.013 0.016 0.051 0.022 0.022 
        
Years of service  0.026* 0.008 0.034 0.018 0.019 0.012 
        
Defined benefit plan  0.340*  0.164         
        
Associate professor  0.269* 0.121 0.399* 0.152 0.032 0.204 
Assistant professor  0.700* 0.201 0.765* 0.231 0.444 0.458 
        
Doctoral 0.433*  0.130  0.311 0.176 0.549* 0.198 
Masters  0.295* 0.126 0.194 0.166 0.393* 0.198 
Bachelor  0.757* 0.245 0.693* 0.289  n.a.   
        
Average raise  -8.872*  2.159  -4.839 2.625  -16.326*  3.763 
        
Pension  accrual/10000  0.035 0.036 0.035 0.040     
Pension 
backloading/10000 
-0.027 0.016 -0.028 0.020     
Backloading < 0  -0.102  0.204  -0.175  0.232     
Pension wealth/100000      0.132  0.825     
Constant -4.644*  0.371  -4.467 0.568 -3.852* 0.486   29
Partial  retirement        
Age        
53-54  1.084  1.122      
55  1.970 1.076 0.880 0.649     
56 2.132*  1.063  0.905  0.631     
57  1.968 1.078 0.658 0.658     
58  3.170* 1.030 1.646* 0.584     
59  2.630* 1.047 0.850 0.641 2.477* 0.682 
60  2.682* 1.040 0.885 0.642 2.353* 0.682 
61  2.912* 1.042 0.961 0.658 2.928* 0.660 
62  2.864* 1.050 1.303* 0.665 1.103 1.128 
63  2.694* 1.060 0.904 0.701 1.996* 0.880 
64  3.912* 1.037 1.551* 0.692 4.233* 0.605 
65  3.542* 1.055 0.844 0.772 4.460* 0.662 
66  3.055* 1.092 1.007 0.786 2.624* 1.147 
67  2.945* 1.118 0.604 0.903 3.235* 0.895 
68  2.919* 1.120 0.705 0.875 2.891* 1.146 
69  3.280* 1.146 1.284 0.883 3.229* 1.153 
70  3.972* 1.135 1.785* 0.907 3.229* 1.153 
71 and over  3.681*  1.098  1.327  0.915  4.085*  0.922 
        
Female  0.030 0.222 -0.078 0.295 0.468 0.408 
African-American -1.764*  0.444 -2.061* 0.546  -0.594 0.766 
Asian or Asian-
American 
-1.306* 0.474 -1.340* 0.536 -1.257 1.043 
Other  nonwhite  -0.034 0.544 -0.143 0.632 -0.228 1.136 
        
Salary/10000 -0.058  0.035  0.069 0.128 -0.023 0.051 
        
Years of service  0.014  0.015 0.076* 0.038  0.015 0.022 
        
Defined benefit plan  0.960*  0.312         
        
Associate professor  -0.056 0.195 -0.302 0.239 0.617 0.366 
Assistant professor  0.074  0.347 0.041 0.386 -0.302 1.095 
        
Doctoral 1.072*  0.214  0.946* 0.260 1.179* 0.402 
Masters  1.008* 0.213 1.054* 0.251 0.840* 0.415 
Bachelor  0.890* 0.453 1.165* 0.481  n.a.   
        
Average raise  -13.704*  4.090  -16.251* 5.257 -11.086 7.331 
        
Pension accrual/10000  0.166*  0.080  0.167  0.102     
Pension 
backloading/10000 
-0.136* 0.055 -0.193* 0.064     
Backloading < 0  0.480  0.338  0.433  0.380     
Pension wealth/100000      -0.224  0.206     
Constant -6.663*  1.154  -5.278* 1.158 -6.727* 1.074 
N  7159  3864  3295  
 
   30
Note: omitted age category is 50-52 for entire sample, 50-54 for defined benefit sample, 
and 50-58 for defined contribution sample.  Ages 69 and 70 are combined into a single 
category in the defined contribution sample.  The binary indicator for bachelor-level 
universities could not be estimated for the defined contribution sample because no one 
in that category elected phased retirement. 
 
•  = Statistically significant at the .05 level 
 